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M. and W.: Automobiles--The Family Purpose Doctrine--Liability of Owner for

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
thought to be entertainable only by a court of general jurisdiction;
yet it would seem reaspnable that, since the statute provides that
the commissioner of accounts shall determine "the amount of the
respective shares of the legatees and distributees," 1 1 the commissioner could incidentally construe the will to the extent of determining what parties were legatees and distributees.
If the intent of the statutory provisions was to furnish a
modern and expeditions means for the settlement of decedents'
estates, such intent can only be fulfilled by holding that county
courts and commissioners of accounts, in passing on matters affecting the final settlement of decedents' estates, as an indispensable
incident of that duty are empowered to exercise certain incidental
judicial powers, in order that such settlement of the estate may
be made final so that personal representatives and their bondsmen
may be discharged from their legal duties and be released from
their conditional obligations. The exercise of. such incidental
judicial powers by probate courts and their statutory adjunct
would continue to be subject, of course, to the chancery and appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts.

P. J. 0F.
THE FAImmY PURPOSE DomRnE -

LIABIuTY
OF OwNER Fop NEGLIGENT OPERATION BY GUFST OF SON. - D permitted B, his son, to operate the family car. B in turn, requested
X, his guest, to drive, who, by his negligence, caused injury to P, a
passenger and guest therein. P alleged that B was the agent of D
and that, when X was requested and permitted by B to operate the
automobile, X became the agent of both D and B, by reason whereof
liability for the injuries sustained by P attached to D. Held, on demurrer, that P's declaration states a cause of action against D under the family purpose doctrine. Eagon v. Woolard.1
The holding in the principal case is a startling extension of
the family purpose doctrine beyond its early application. The doctrine arose as a rule of convenience rather than as a logical rule of
law. Early the courts recognized the automobile as a dangerous instrumentality and the resulting necessity for fixing liabliity upon
one financially responsible. To accomplish this desirable result the
courts distorted the principles of agency law into the family
AUTOOBIUsS

11W.

-

VA.CODE (Miebie, 1937) c. 44, art. 2, § 1.

111 S. E. (2d) 275 (W. Va. 1940).
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purpose doctrine, predicating liability upon the fiction that the
2
son's pleasure was the father's business.
Since the doctrine is based upon a fiction of law and the
automobile is no longer considered a dangerous instrumentality,
a great majority of the courts of the land have abandoned the
doctrine and now base liability wholly upon the true agency relationship.3 Further, recognizing the weakness of the doctrine,
the courts have not extended the rule to include instrumentalities
4
other than the automobile.
The West Virginia court, in the principal case, recognized
the family purpose doctrine as being firmly established in this
state and further said that it would be a narrow construction to refuse to extend the doctrine to include the situation here presented.
As mentioned above, it has been abandoned in many strong jurisdictions. Moreover, in those states which adhere to the doctrine there
is a division of authority as to the advisability of its extension to
include the guest of the son within the scope of the rule.' It is
2 Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828 (1922); Appleman, Special
Phasev of the Fanily 1'urpose Doctrine (1936) 14 TENN. L. REv. 307; HARPER,
TORTS (1933) § 283; MEHEM, AGENoY (1923) § 515. See also the instant
case which recognizes the fiction.
3 Hackley v. Robey, 170 Va. 55, 195 S. E. 689 (1938), commented on in
(1938) 24 VA. L. REv. 931, which also collects cases; MEcHmu, AGENCY :615;
Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123 N. E. 30 (1919); McGowan v. Longwood, 242
Mass. 337, 136 N. E. 72 (1922); Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111, 115
N. B,. 443 (1917); Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio St. 186, 126 N. E. 66 (1919); Piquet
v. Wazelle, 288 Pa. 463, 136 Atl. 787 (1927). But see Stickney v. Epstein,
100 Conn. 170, 123 Ati. 1 (1923); Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn. 277, 146
N. W. 1091 (1914); Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. B. 828 (1922).
However, 4. . . the tendency to return to strict agency principles has been
particularly noticeable in recent years", (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 931, 937.
4 Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minm. 357, 241 N. W. 37, 79 A. L. R. 11591 (1932).
It is interesting to note that the Minnesota court in Kayser v. Van Nest, 125
Minn. 277, 146 N. W. 1091 (1914), extended the family purpose doctrine to
include the situation in the principal case, yet, in the Felcyn case, the court
refused to include motorboats within the doctrine on the ground that the
motorboat was not a dangerous instrumentality. Today the West Virginia
court, and courts generally, recognize the automobile as no longer being such
an instrumentality.
s Van Ordsel, J., speaking for the court in Turoff v. Burch, 50X F. (2d) 986,
988 (D. C. 1931), said: "We think that the extension of the 'family purpose'
doctrine of liability for the negligence of third persons who have been placed
in the operation of the car by the member of the family using it and without
the knowledge, permission or direction of the owner is not warranted by the
great weight of authority... "; Samples v. Shaw, 47 Ga. App. 337, 170 S. E.
389 (1933) ; Wilde v. Pearson, 140 Minn. 394, 168 N. W. 582 (1918) ; Appleman, supra n. 2, at 307; Armstrong v. Sellers, 182 Ala. 582, 62 So. 28 (1913).
But see Grant v. Knepper, 245 N. Y. 158, 156 N. E. 650 (1927); Kayser v. Van
Nest, 125 Minn. 277, 146 N. W. 1091 (1914); Thixton v. Palmer, 210 Ky.
838, 276 S. W. 971 (1925); Goss v. Wlliams, 196 N. C. 213, 145 S. E. 169
(1928); Ulman v. Lindeman, 44 N. D. 36, 176 N. W. 25 (1919).
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further submitted that the cases allowing the 6xtension may be
distinguished on agency principles8
The disposition of the instant case being on demurrer, it
seems that the court could have adhered more strictly to the agency
principles of management and control, which it articulates, rather
than applying an extended doctrine of vicarious liability in sustaining the declaration. Nevertheless, in apparently allowing this extension, the court has followed the weight of authority in those
jurisdictions committed to the family purpose doctrine.

L. R. M.
K. W. Jr.
CRIMINAL LA

-

INDICTMENT -

STATUTORY SHORT FORM. -

D was charged and convicted of statutory rape' under the statutory
short-form indictment which failed to allege the age of the accused
and the previous chastity of the prosecutrix. HeZd, that the indictment is demurrable although drawn in the form prescribed by
statute.2 State v. Ray.2
This case suggests that a limitation is placed upon the legislature as to what extent the common law indictment may be shortened and still protect the constitutional rights of the accused. Many
courts of this country followed precedent, established at common
law, of lengthy and technical indictments4 in which justice was
6 In Grau v. Knepper, 245 N. Y. 158, 156 N. E. 650 (1927), the relationship of master and servant was established on common law principles in that

the servant was present and acquiesced in the negligent act and, moreover,
was negligent in placing control in the hands of an incompetent person. In
Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn. 277, 146 N. W. 1091 (1914), the daughter,
although not personally operating the car, had not relinquished control over
it.

In Scdreder v. Litchy, 190 Minn. 264, 251 N. W. 513 (1933), there was

evidence of direct authority in the servant to select a third person to operate
the car. In Thixton v. Palmer, 210 Ky. 838, 276 S. W. 971 (1925), the case
was based on the theory of constructive identity, i.e., the negligence of the
guest driver was the negligence of the member of the family present. The
case of Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145 S. E. 169 (1928), presents the
situation of the driver proceeding at a high rate of speed with the acquiescence of the member of the family present. In Ulman v. Lindeman, 44
N. D. 36, 176 N. W. 25 (1919), the court indulges in an extensive discussion
of the principles of agency and observes that the declaration would only permit recovery under the doctrine of constructive identity, yet the court cites
the leading family purpose extension cases.
1W. VA. CoDE (Mieie, 1937) e. 61, art. 2, § 15.
2Id. at c. 62, art. 9, § 7.
. 7 S. B. (2d) 654 (IV. Va. 1940).
4Marsh v. State, 3 Ala. App. 80, 57 So. 387 (1912) ; State v. Harris, 3 Harr.
559 (Del. 1841); State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa 477 (1859); Lemons v. State, 4
W. Va. 755 (1870).
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